

Principles of Corporate Governance

By

In its 2004 *Principles of Corporate Governance*, the international Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) describes corporate governance as “a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders.” At first glance this statement isn’t particularly earth shattering. If anything, it’s painfully obvious. But if you focus on the word “relationships” — a word that lies not only at the heart of the sentence but of corporate governance as well — things get more complicated. Why? Because relationships among these groups are anything but simple. They’re what negotiation experts call “mixed-motive” relationships, and they’re exceedingly prone to break-down and failure. Consider a recent Booz Allen Hamilton study of the world’s 2,500 largest publicly traded corporations. Calling record-high turnover among executives “the new normal,” this study reports that forced turnover among CEOs rose 318% since 1995. In 2006, one out of every three CEOs left involuntarily. Nearly a quarter of the forced departures followed from conflicts with the board — up from 2% in 1995. In each case, shareholders ended up footing the bill. These statistics reflect at a macro level pervasive turmoil at a human level — turmoil that can only be understood by looking at the shifting relationship between boards and CEOs. Two cases I studied illustrate the point. In the first, a young entrepreneurial CEO of a fast-growing firm was under siege from her board after an especially tumultuous year. While the firm’s results were still strong, the board’s activist chairman quite rightfully worried about the organization’s longer-term health. Why was there so much turnover in the higher ranks? Why wasn’t she sticking to the firm’s strategy? Was she too volatile and opportunistic to take the organization to the next level? These are exactly the kinds of questions boards are charged with asking and CEOs are charged with answering. Chairman’s tirade Yet that isn’t what happened. Instead, having privately reached his own conclusions, the chairman more or less subtly launched one criticism after another at the CEO. Feeling undermined and outraged, the CEO retaliated in kind, countering each “attack” with one defensive maneuver after another. Unable to see eye-to-eye, each brought the worst out in the other, making it impossible for them to fulfill their governance responsibilities. Indeed, far from creating value for the organization, their

.relationship . was .systematically .destroying .it. .Had .the . two .not .had .the .good .sense .to .get .help, . the .CEO .might .easily .have .ended .up .as . just .another .statistic. In .the .second .case, .just .the .oppo - site .happened, .but .with .similar .results. . Despite .mounting .worr y .over .an .18- month .period, .the .board .members .of . a .well-known .manufacturing .company . were .unable .to .stop .the .firm .from .slip - ping .ever .further .into .the .doldrums. .The . company’s .CEO, .who .fancied .himself .a . master .at .“managing” .public .boards, . 64 directors & boards endnote The heart of the matter Good governance depends on good relationships between the management and the board. Sounds simple and straightforward? It’s not. By diana McLain smith Continued on page 63 Diana McLain Smith is the author of Divide Or Conquer: How Great Teams Turn Conflict into Strength (Portfolio/Penguin USA) and a partner at the Monitor Group, a global manage- ment consulting firm. Her Web site is www. dianamclainsmith.com. Unable to see eye-to-eye, the chairman and the CEO brought the worst out in the other. fourth Quarter 2008 63 endnote Advertiser index Drexel University Corporate Governance Center www.lebow.drexel.edu/centers/corpgovpage 11 Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP www.drinkerbiddle.compage 3 FTI Consulting www.fticonsulting.compage 9 Gevril www.gevril.compage 13 Heidrick & Struggles www.heidrick.compage 5 Kroll www.kroll.cominside front cover Navigators Pro www.navg.comback cover Seyfarth Shaw LLP www.seyfarth.compage 7 Sidley Austin LLP www.sidley.compage 17 Stanford Law School www.directorscollege.cominside back cover University of Delaware www.udel.edupage 16 spent .days .every .quarter .preparing .air- tight .presentations .that .anticipated .every . possible .question, .challenge, .or .criticism . that .might .come .his .way. .The .board, .dis - couraged .by .the .CEO’s .pat .presentations . yet .loathe .to .interfere .in .his .management . of .the .firm, .tacitly .complied. .It .wasn’t . until .the .firm’s .stock .price .collapsed .that . the .directors .finally .took .action, .firing . the .CEO .and .half .his .team. In .an .ideal .world, .cases .like .these . would .be .the .exception, .not .the .“new . normal.” .In . that . ideal . world, .boards . and . CEOs . would . jointly . define .their .compa - ny’s .strategic .challenges, .jointly .identify . the .information .needed .to .address .them, . jointly .assess .the .CEO’s .developmental . needs, .and . jointly . ensure . accountability . for .results. .In .the .real .world, .this .hap - pens .all .too .rarely. .Why? B e cause .we .have .our .attent ion .so . squarely .focused .on .individuals .— .on . their .personalities, .their .performance, . and .their .potential .— .that .we .pay .little .

attention to the quality of the relationship between a company's management and its board. Yet my studies suggest that these relationships have a profound, even decisive impact on a CEO's personality and performance and whether he or she can realize a firm's full potential. The bottom line is this: good governance depends on good relationships. When relationships break down, neither boards nor CEOs can effectively fulfill their governance duties. As boards continue to redefine their roles and become more active, it's imperative that they give relationships the time and attention they require. When the entrepreneurial CEO and her board chair did just that, they successfully worked together to change the polarized dynamics that were undermining her ability to lead and their collective ability to govern. A year later, the problems that so worried the chairman and thwarted the CEO were no longer an issue, and the two were able to put their attention where it most belonged: on growing the enterprise. ■ The author can be contacted at dianamsmith@comcast.net. Heart of the matter Continued from page 64 The relationship with the board has a decisive impact on a CEO's personality.