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Feature
What It Means To Be a Fiduciary A formula for meeting the expectations of
the
role is to be deeply informed, perpetually skeptical, and collegially
independent. But
"fiduciary" is at the heart of governance. Sitting on any governing
board -- corporate, mutual fund, or nonprofit -- means first and
foremost
serving as a fiduciary. And that concept is as relevant today as it was
75 or
100 years ago when our grandparents learned the basics, if not more so. At
its root, "fiduciary" derives from the Latin fidere, to trust. A
fiduciary is someone who holds something in trust for another. Its
Anglo-Saxon
synonym is "trust," derived from the Middle English traust, meaning
trust, protection, or firmness. These two linguistic first cousins
share a
common concept of confidence in the integrity, veracity, and
reliability of
someone to act on another's behalf. At the heart of being a fiduciary The heart
of being a fiduciary is acting as you
would wish another to act on your own behalf. Representing the
interests of the
shareholder as a director of a company means putting yourself in the
position
of continually asking how you would wish to be treated if you were
yourself a
shareholder. Would you feel -- at all times and in all circumstances --
fully
comfortable with the judgments, actions, and decisions you made as a
director?
Would you be prepared to entrust additional resources -- financial,
intellectual, personal -- to such a person? Would you have confidence
that such
trust would be warranted, tomorrow morning as well as 10 years from now? This
view of being a fiduciary is, of course, but a restatement of the
Golden Rule
-- "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" -- put into
business terms. My own experience is that the Golden Rule provides
clear,
unambiguous, and straightforward guidance as to appropriate behavior,
whether
in the boardroom, the showroom, or the conference room.
At
its heart, the Golden Rule supplies a disarmingly direct way of
assessing one's
own conduct as well as that of others. It rests, in the final analysis,
on a
deceptively simple judgment, though one difficult to always follow and
often
one that is uncomfortable in application. It is hard to believe that
board
members of Adelphia, MCI, or Tyco were truly acting as they would wish
to have
been treated. Essential
characteristics A true
fiduciary -- one who constantly acts as
he or she would wish to be treated by someone acting on his or her
behalf --
has:
--
the highest integrity,
--
an instinctive curiosity,
--
a skeptical and inquiring mind,
--
sound business judgment,
--
independence of thought,
--
high energy,
--
a strong interest in the business of the organization on whose board he
or she
sits, and
--
a constant focus on the best interests of those whose stakeholdings he
or she
is representing. Based
on my experience and observation, these attributes boil down to three
essential
characteristics: being deeply informed, perpetually skeptical, and
collegially
independent. Each is important; each reflects a complementary
perspective; and
each allows for evolving complexity, new situations, and different
demands. Being
deeply informed Above all,
a board member must be deeply
knowledgeable about the business of the organization -- its purpose and
mission; its strategic situation, aspirations, opportunities, and
challenges;
its operations, management structure, and finances; and its history,
culture,
and fundamental values -- so that he can effectively represent the
interests of
the shareholders or beneficiaries. A fiduciary must also have a keen
understanding
of the broader context within which the business or organization
operates; a
detailed knowledge of regulatory requirements and environment; and a
crisp
understanding of trends in the industry. I
recall one well-meaning director who never mastered the technical and
legal
aspects of the company -- operating in a highly regulated industry --
on whose
board he had served for some 15 years, and seemed to assume blithely
that
management was fully on top of these matters. It is inconceivable to me
that he
could explain the policy and strategy decisions made by the board to a
shareholder of the company -- reflecting an utter failure in carrying
out his
fiduciary responsibilities, for a director must be both well informed
and able
to explain cogently what he is doing. Fiduciaries
must continuously and fully satisfy themselves that they are
knowledgeable
about the various issues central to the business and industry; have
tested,
probed, and examined these issues; and have put management and their
external
advisers to the test -- at the governance level, of course, not the
executive
level. This
requires a sound education for the new director just joining a board,
as well
as a regular, "institutionalized" formal program of continuing
education that will enable all board members to keep abreast of the
industry,
be alert to new trends and issues, and anticipate new developments and
challenges. Possible
components of such a program of continuing education include insisting
that
management brief the board fully and regularly on all industry-wide
matters
relevant to the company; bringing in outside speakers to talk about
particular
matters of interest and concern; and encouraging board members to be
active in
outside activities that provide opportunities for networking and
informal
discussion. The continuing-education initiatives should be reviewed
annually,
as part of a regular yearly evaluation of the performance of the board
as a
whole and each individual member. Without
being well-informed, a fiduciary does not have the knowledge base from
which to
make sound decisions, evaluate alternatives, and represent the best
interests
of the shareholders. Being
perpetually skeptical Secondly,
the board as a whole and each member
on it should be a skeptic at heart, always and unrelentingly probing,
asking,
exploring -- "Why this?" "What about that?" "Have you
thought of ...?" -- both at the macro or policy level and in the
details. Nothing
should be off the table. There can never be too many questions; the
answers should
always be tested:
--
"How do our shareholders benefit from this proposal?"
--
"What are the alternatives that have been discarded, and why?"
--
"How does this proposal enable the organization to realize its
longer-term
strategic objectives and therefore benefit our shareholders in the
future?"
--
"What does the number in the second paragraph on page 39 mean?"
--
"What is the CEO worrying about at night, and why?"
--
"What should the board be discussing a year from now, and why?"
--
"What questions should we as directors be raising but are not?" And
so on.... These and a thousand other questions indicate more than
curiosity or
diligence. They reflect a relentlessly skeptical mind that seeks
continually to
ascertain whether the actions being proposed are, in fact, in the best
interests of the parties for whom the director serves as a fiduciary.
The
director's questioning should convey a serious but benign "show me"
attitude. The director should be as skeptical as an intelligent
shareholder would
be in asking questions about the actions of the board or the decisions
of the
organization. The director should welcome exactly that same kind of
skepticism
from the parties she represents. A positive,
while skeptical, posture
demonstrates to management the seriousness with which the director is
taking
her responsibilities. It creates a healthy tension between management
and
board, clarifying their quite different responsibilities and roles. It
enables
the director to satisfy herself that she has been watchful. It meets
the
fundamental test -- or at least an essential aspect of it -- about
whether the
shareholders' interests are being thoughtfully, responsibly, and
prudently
fulfilled. Being
collegially independent Thirdly, a
fiduciary must be altogether
independent -- of management, fellow board members, and any fiercely
partisan
shareholder constituencies. The
tough-minded fiduciary understands that independence of thought and
action is
essential to representing well the interests of another party. He can
simultaneously be actively engaged in the work of the organization
while having
the objectivity of an interested and well-informed bystander. While in
the
boardroom -- subject to the culture, rhythms, needs, and challenges of
the
organization’s governance -- the fiduciary must separate out competing
matters
and make decisions that are in the best interests of the shareholder. I
once observed the chairman of the finance committee of a major
institution
single-handedly argue against disposing of a major asset that everyone
else on
the board was prepared to sell. The board’s thinking was that the asset
sale
would buy a few years of continued solvency. His independence, and his
long-term view, ultimately carried the day and the board held tight.
That asset
is now worth five times the price being considered at the time, and the
institution has never been financially stronger. Someone
who has the requisite integrity, clear-headedness, and tough mindedness
will
have the necessary ingredients to act and be comfortably firm (to
recall one of
the meanings of traust) while respecting differences of opinion and
perspective, even when the issues are particularly complex, the
ultimate best
interests of shareholders are illusive, pressures to act one way or
another are
vigorous, and time is running out. Certainly
there should be a fundamental and mutual relationship of respect,
cooperation,
collegiality, and trust between the director and management -- just as
there
should be between the director and his fellow board members. The
question
always is whether those with responsibility are carrying out their
responsibilities with integrity, competence, and care -- whether they
be
operational, executive, or governance responsibilities. If so, one
should have
a high, or relatively high, comfort level; if not, then one should act
to
change it. But
at the end of the day, being independent means exactly that: never
going along
with anyone when it does not seem right, does not feel right, or is not
right. A
well-informed, constitutionally skeptical, and collegially independent
director
or trustee who always focuses on the best interests of shareholders
will surely
act like a fiduciary -- and thus be a fiduciary -- in matters both
large and
small. Such a fiduciary will be able to sleep well at night, as will
the
shareholders, donors, and beneficiaries of the organization on whose
board he
or she sits. |
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| Anthony
Knerr is managing director of Anthony Knerr
& Associates (www.aknerr.com),
a consulting firm that assists
leading
nonprofit institutions in the Copyright © 2004 Directors & Boards, P.O. Box 41966 Philadelphia, PA 19101-1966. All rights reserved. Contact the webmaster. < Privacy Notice > |
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